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The Jurisprudence of the
Military-Industrial Complex
Ann Scales
Laura Spitz1
This is the text of a joint lecture delivered at Seattle University on
February 27, 2003, sponsored by the Wismer Center. Given the timing and
subject matter of the talk, it is necessarily a snapshot of a particular
moment in history, touching on events that will undoubtedly have developed
further by the time of publication—for example, the “official war” against
Iraq will have started and maybe ended. At the presentation, we took a
“tag-team” approach, each talking twice in turn, and we have maintained
that format for this publication.

ANN SCALES:
I have long complained—including in a speech at the law school of this
university some years ago—about how legal education typically starts in on
Day One telling law students how little, really, law can accomplish in the
world.2 Even when I was in law school, that message was terribly
disempowering. But today the disempowerment is huge. Law and lawyers
seem unable to do anything about the systematic disempowerment of law
itself in the name of law, such as in the USA Patriot Act,3 the Homeland
Security Act,4 or the soon expected Patriot Act II.
Today, though, Laura and I are not going to rehash the specifics of that
legislation or any U.N. resolutions. Instead, we are going to talk more
broadly, about the relationship between the rule of law and the militaryindustrial complex.
What is “the rule of law”? The phrase represents a deeply held value that
provokes little agreement.5 I suspect that even the most contentious
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jurisprudes, however, would concede two things. First, for a system to
count as a genuinely democratic rule of law, the rules have to apply to
everybody. Second, there has to be a detached adjudicative process;
decisions about the rules cannot be delegated to the very people the law is
there to protect us against.
And what is “the military-industrial complex”? The term was introduced
into the political vernacular by President Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell
speech. Eisenhower described how World War II and the Cold War had
compelled the United States, for the first time, to commit to a large standing
army and a permanent armaments industry.
These developments,
Eisenhower thought, had the gravest implications for democracy and
survival. Keeping in mind his brilliant military career, recall the most
famous sentence of Eisenhower’s farewell address: “[W]e must guard
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”6
So, what is the jurisprudence of the military-industrial complex? The
short answer is this: the military-industrial complex has arrived at a comfy
situation where it is either exempt from the rule of law, or else gets to make
every decision that informs what the rule of law would require in a given
situation. It is kind of like having your cake and eating it with the Lord.
Eisenhower could have no idea how huge, seamless, and synergistic this
complex would become, including not just weapons manufacture, but
virtually all relations of law, production, and populations in the world. I am
going to take a couple of minutes to spell out how the military side of this
complex presently works, erasing boundaries with industrial interests, and
indeed, with any other legally recognized interests at all.
First, our nation’s history and legitimacy rest upon a separation of
military power from democratic governance. For that reason, the armed
forces are subject to constitutional constraint.
Second, however, as an aspect of separation of powers, courts try not to
interfere in areas of foreign policy and military affairs. Often this is
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referred to as the “political question” doctrine, a determination that a matter
is beyond the capabilities of judges. The strongest argument for this
deference is that the political branches—or the military itself—have
superior expertise in military matters. That may be true in some situations.
I am not sure, for example, the Supreme Court would have been the best
crowd to organize the invasion of Normandy. But what we now have is an
increasingly irrational deference.7 Consider three cases:
a. In Korematsu v. United States,8 the Supreme Court said the internment
of Japanese-Americans at the beginning of 1942 was constitutional,
based upon a military assessment of the possibility of espionage in
preparation for a Japanese invasion of the United States. It turns out
that the information provided by the military to the Supreme Court
was falsified.9 But note two things: (1) the nation was in the midst of
a declared world war, and (2) in subsequent less urgent
circumstances, Korematsu would seem to argue strongly for military
justifications to have to be based upon better, more reliable
information than was offered there.
b. In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg,10 the Supreme Court decided
that it was constitutional for Congress to exclude women from the
peacetime registration of potential draftees, even though both the
Department of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff had testified that
including women would increase military readiness. But Congress
got the benefit of the military deference doctrine as a cover for what I
think was a sinister political purpose—to protect the manliness of
war—and the Supreme Court felt perfectly free to ignore what those
with the real expertise had to say.
c. Most recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Fourth Circuit held that a
U.S. citizen who had been designated an “enemy combatant”12 could
be detained indefinitely without access to counsel. In this case,
however, not only is there no declared war,13 but also, the only
evidence regarding Mr. Hamdi was a two-page affidavit by a Defense
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Department underling, Mr. Mobbs. Mobbs stated that Mr. Hamdi was
captured in Afghanistan, and had been affiliated with a Taliban
military unit. The government would not disclose the criteria for the
“enemy combatant” designation, the statements of Mr. Hamdi that
allegedly satisfied those criteria, nor any other bases for the
conclusion of Taliban “affiliation.”14 And that is as good as the
evidence for life imprisonment without trial has to be. Deference to
the military has become abdication.
In other words, what we presently have is not civilian government under
military control, but something potentially worse, a civilian government
ignoring military advice,15 but using the legal doctrine of military deference
for its own imperialist ends.
Third, the gigantic military establishment and permanent arms industry
are now in the business of justifying their continued existences. This
justification is done primarily, as you know, by retooling for post-Cold War
enemies—the so-called “rogue states”—while at the same time creating
new ones, for example by arming corrupt regimes in Southeast Asia.16 I
was reminded of this recently when we went to see comedian Kate Clinton.
She thought Secretary Powell had taken too much trouble in his
presentation attempting to convince the Security Council that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction.17 Why not, she asked, “just show them the
receipts?”
Fourth, we have seen the exercise of extraordinary influence by arms
makers on both domestic and foreign policy. For domestic pork barrel and
campaign finance reasons, obsolete or unproven weapons systems continue
to be funded even when the military does not want them!18 And, just when
we thought we had survived the nuclear arms race nightmare, the United
States has undertaken to design new kinds of nuclear weapons,19 even when
those designs have little military value.20 Overseas, limitations on arms
sales are being repealed, and arms markets that should not exist are being
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constantly expanded21 for the sake of dumping inventory, even if those
weapons are eventually used for “rogue” purposes by rogue states.
This system skews security considerations, and militarizes foreign policy.
Force has to be the preferred option because other conduits of policy are not
sufficiently well-funded. Plus, those stockpiled weapons have got to be
used or sold so that we can build more.
Fifth, enlarging upon this in a document entitled The National Security
Policy of the United States, we were treated last September to “the Bush
doctrine,” which for the first time in U.S. history declares a preemptive
strike policy. This document states, “America will act against emerging
threats before they are fully formed.”22 If they are only emerging and not
fully formed, you may wonder, how will we know they are “threats”?
Because someone in Washington has that perception, and when the hunch
hits, it is the official policy of this country to deploy the military.23 All
options—including the use of nuclear weapons—are always on the table.
Finally, there go the fundamental constitutional distinctions on which the
republic’s legitimacy relies. Orwell’s satire seems too mild. In his 1984,
the slogan was, “War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is
Strength.”24 In this real 2003 world, there are no meaningful distinctions
between wartime and peacetime, between war front and home front,
between combatant and non-combatant, or between emergency defensive
needs and foreign policy generally. We are slaves of fear. Fear makes us
give away our freedoms and embrace ignorance as a precondition of
continued existence.
But in whose interests? Isn’t it possible that this state of “permanent
crisis” is just a means to keep us on board? That blaring nationalism is just
a distraction, while corporate interests control everything including this
fearful consciousness? Remember, we are supposed to be shopping for
America!
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LAURA SPITZ:
I am going to talk about the connections among business interests and
military interests, focusing on the business or industrial aspects of the
military-industrial complex. As a paradigm of the military-industrial link, 25
think of Mr. Rumsfeld’s recent criticisms of the draft during the Vietnam
War. The draft was a bad idea, he said, because many men had to work for
the U.S. government at less than their market value.26 In this statement—
which he later regretted—Mr. Rumsfeld let reality get loose: what matters
in the Administration’s decisions is what the market wants to matter, and
who loses are the people the market would willingly let lose.
Also paradigmatic of the link between business and the military is the
Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy, which, as Ann said, was
published in September 2002. In that document, the Administration tries to
make the case for the critical importance of global free enterprise to our
national security by simply making the statement that this is so: “Free
markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy.”27
According to the White House, in making these claims America has both
morality and history on its side. In fact, the published documents state, “the
concept of free trade arose as a moral principle even before it became a
pillar of economics,”28 and, “the lessons of history are clear,”29 the lesson
being that this Administration’s version of a free market economy is the
best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.
In this new vision for national security, lower tax rates in foreign
countries are a priority,30 apparently key to our safety. Why is it a National
Security strategy of the United States that foreign countries have lower
marginal tax rates? First, apparently this infusion of capital will provide an
incentive for people to work in those countries31 (as if the reason they are
presently poor and unemployed is a lack of motivation). Second, poverty
and destitution are underlying conditions that terrorists can exploit;32
therefore, U.S. foreign policies and strategies should be aimed at
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diminishing those underlying conditions,33 and lower tax rates are an
effective strategy for that purpose.
This last justification—a concern for underlying conditions—seems
disingenuous, particularly as (1) there is no meaningful consideration of
other ways that the U.S. might assist in the diminishment of poverty and
destitution, and (2) the White House has also stated that terrorist cells are
established in very open, liberal, and tolerant societies, like the U.S. and
other market-based economies.34
It would seem that the real connection among lower foreign tax rates, free
trade, and National Security has to do with the legitimation of rampant
greed by invocation of patriotism and fear. Lower taxes mean more money
for entities with enough capital to invest in foreign countries, such as a
future Iraq with a denationalized oil industry. And in order to insulate its
foreign economic agenda from review and meaningful criticism, the White
House needs to posit its economic foreign policy as a National Security
issue. That way, to criticize the statement that the White House’s global
economic vision is the “single sustainable economic model”35 is to be a
traitor.
Economic global power becomes a sovereign imperative,
legitimately backed by military force. And as Ann told us, when the White
House is making “military” decisions, we can rely on American courts to
defer to those decisions.
This is a relatively cozy place to be, a place where the civilian population
has no business questioning foreign economic policy or the wedding of
military, industry, and national destiny. Add to this the fact of the
Administration’s claim that free trade is actually a moral imperative, that as
a matter of National Security the United States will enforce trade
agreements, and the Administration has no difficulty breaching other
treaties and U.N. resolutions,36 and one can see that its place is not only
cozy, but also lawless.
Though I am not a strong supporter of President Bush, and I would like to
blame him for this, he is not the architect of the pro-business elision of
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national and international interests. One of the best examples predating
him, of course, is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
substance of which is astonishing to the uninitiated.37
How does it work? Whole books and courses are devoted to the subject,
but I want to make four points for our purposes here. First, while domestic
business is ostensibly constrained by existing domestic laws,38 multinational
enterprises are not easily subjected to national policy in an increasingly
globalized economy. That problem is hugely exacerbated by NAFTA,
because even when domestic law may be potentially enforceable, Canada,
the United States, and Mexico are required by NAFTA to enact and
interpret domestic laws in the “least trade restrictive” manner.39
Second, Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides that private investors may
directly sue national governments to enforce NAFTA obligations and to
recover damages, including pure economic loss. This is an incredibly
powerful and unusual grant of legal standing to non-parties, since NAFTA
is actually a contract between nations.40
Third, this Administration has made it a part of its National Security
Strategy to enforce trade agreements.41 Presumably, the United States will
not invade Canada to enforce NAFTA,42 but the coupling of this
commitment with the threat of military force is obviously meant to provoke
fear.
Finally, taken in combination—the restraint on domestic governments
from enacting or enforcing laws inconsistent with NAFTA obligations, the
grant of standing to investors to sue for lost profits, and the underlying
threat of force—the situation operates so that NAFTA actually acts as an
insurance policy for corporations doing business among the member states.
In many cases domestic legal restraints have become largely symbolic,
while taxpayers subsidize and guarantee corporate income levels.
For example, in 1997, Canada banned the importation and transport of
MMT,43 a gasoline additive and dangerous neurotoxin already banned by
the United States. The U.S. producer had enjoyed steady sales to Canadian
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companies before the ban. Less than a week after the ban was passed, that
producer filed a claim under NAFTA against Canada for $250 million in
damages. Canada settled the case by repealing its ban on MMT, paying $13
million in damages to the producer and issuing a public statement that
MMT poses no health risk.44
I want to turn at this point to the domestic protection of business interests
in the U.S. (which unsurprisingly fits perfectly with U.S. global economic
and military strategies).
In the last two decades, we have seen
unprecedented deregulation and privatization in the U.S. (and Canada and
Mexico). This has been coupled with putting business beyond interrogation
by law, much like the military. Where the law does not operate to
businesses’ advantage, doctrines have been arranged to exempt them from
the application of domestic law altogether, so that business drives
interpretation and development of jurisprudence in many areas of law.
There are so many examples I cannot possibly list them. You
undoubtedly have encountered many. In sex discrimination employment
law, for example, we have the “business necessity” and “bona fide
occupational qualification” defenses, those masterpieces of majoritarianism
that have made it safe for Hooters to serve breasts for lunch.45 In the airline
industry, we have seen deregulation, union-busting, and unprecedented
government bailouts. Today, I would like to mention just two other
instances, both of which will be familiar to you—tort reform and Enron.
In the last 25 years, tort ‘reform’ has been astonishing both in substance
and momentum.46 In public discourse, it is now taken for granted that all
manner of tort restriction efforts make sense, including all kinds of damages
caps,47 litigation hurdles, and immunities.48 This acceptability is the
triumph of Law and Economics theorists, who have pursued a relentless
public relations and public policy campaign to limit the reach of tort law in
the service of business interests. One way in which they have done this is
to cast—some have said “create”—an insurance crisis49 as the result of
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greedy trial lawyers and out-of-control juries,50 rather than as the effects of
for-profit insurance schemes (or the number of tortfeasors).
However, the Law and Economics view of tort law and tort reforms is not
“natural” or “inevitable” but simply well-funded51 and well-advertised.52
One such funder is the John M. Olin Foundation, which contributed over
$17 million to law schools in 1999 alone53 (including $6 million to Harvard,
$1.25 million to Stanford, $2.5 million to Chicago, and $2 million to
Yale54). The foundation funds chairs to be filled with like-minded Law and
Economics proponents who will teach students, who will go on to be
lawyers and teachers and judges, who will theorize cases and interpret the
law and teach more students. The foundation also funds conferences in
which the judiciary is invited to participate.55 It is no accident that the bulk
of this money is directed to the “big” schools, from which the “important”
policy-makers, future law teachers, and judges come. Nice work if you can
get it.
With respect to Enron, I do not propose to rehash recent corporate
scandals. I simply want to emphasize the point that most of what these
companies did was lawful. It is an almost perfect example of what happens
when decisions are put in the hands of the people from whom the rules were
meant to protect us.56 And meanwhile, the man who used to run Enron’s
corrupt energy trading division is not only not in trouble, he is the Secretary
of the Army. And that, incredibly, makes him the man in charge of the
Army budget.57

ANN SCALES:
What shall we do with this state of affairs? Are we willing to accept that
“globalization”—as defined by free marketeers—is a law of nature, like
gravity? On the military side of things, are we willing to accept that
warfare has so fundamentally changed that no rules apply? Shall we
concede that the Critical Legal Scholars were right in the first place: that the
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“Rule of Law” was always just a big hoax, a veneer of legitimacy over the
exercise of raw power?
We would rather encourage the viewpoint that this state of affairs is a
fabulous learning opportunity, and maybe even a watershed moment for the
U.S. Constitution. Maybe this is a chance to change all that disempowering
orthodoxy about how the law really cannot do much.
One thing lawyers can do, as lawyers have always done, is to keep calling
upon the courts to step up to the Constitutional plate. But will the courts do
it this time? A case filed in Boston asking the court to declare the pending
invasion of Iraq unconstitutional was dismissed recently as a “political
question.”58 That didn’t take long, but I will bet the judicial struggle is just
heating up. 59
During the Vietnam era, the United States Supreme Court had more than
two dozen opportunities to rule on the constitutionality of the conflict.60
Instead of doing so, the Court routinely denied review where lower courts
had refused to rule on grounds of foreign policy and military deference,
typically because the Vietnam War presented a so-called “political
question.”61 As I have said before, this hands-off approach is based on
judges’ declarations of their own ignorance and incompetence.
Specifically, the political question doctrine is based upon six factors the
United States Supreme Court explicated in 1962. The Court stated that
judges should refrain from making a decision where there can be said to be:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.62
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A thousand law review articles deconstruct these six factors, and I am not
going to do so, nor even take time to show how absolutely circular the
doctrine is here. Rather, I am going to translate those factors to show how
they can be understood as a declaration of existential angst and means of
self-anesthesia in an age of imminent war.
So, you might hear a judge quote from the six-factor “political question”
test: “I’m not going to decide this case challenging the constitutionality of
war in Iraq because it is ‘textually committed to another branch of
government,’ and there are no ‘judicially discoverable and manageable
standards’ for deciding it.” When he says that, you might hear him really
saying to himself: This is freaking me out. There is so much information
flying around and somebody is obviously lying. But World War III can’t
really happen, can it? I need to go to chambers and take a Valium.
Or, when a judge says, “I’m not going to decide this case because there is
a need for ‘unquestioning adherence to decisions already made,’ and I have
to ‘show respect for co-ordinate branches,’” you can hear the judge really
saying to himself: Please do not let this have anything to do with me. I will
never make it to the Court of Appeals if I’m the one who blows the whistle
on these maniacs.
Or, finally, when a judge says, “I’m not going to decide this case because
‘there is a potential for embarrassment to the government,’” perhaps he’s
really saying: Well, duh. There is a lot of potential embarrassment for me,
too, especially if the President doesn’t obey my decision.
Indeed, in the political question and war powers literature, there is a great
deal of concern about enforcement of a judicial order respecting foreign
policy or military affairs.63 There is much to discuss here, including the
scope of any remedy ordered. In any case, contrary to the apocryphal story
about President Andrew Jackson,64 no executive yet has refused to comply
with an order of the Supreme Court.65 Moreover, as that Court stated in
1969,66 possible noncompliance with an order is not a reason for the
judiciary to abandon its unique obligation.
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And maybe that is the meaning of “the rule of law.”
I want to be part of a legal system where a judge can look at a challenge
to war mongering and say to himself, to the parties, and to the world: It is
my duty to decide this case. I can do so with as much confidence as I have
in any other case where fact-finding is difficult. I will uphold my oath of
office and I expect the President to uphold his. If the executive branch is
acting unconstitutionally, I must order it to desist. That will not be a
constitutional crisis. Crisis results when the law is routinely ignored and
when that is ratified by judicial silence. The problem is not that I will act,
but what inaction might allow to happen. I am entrusted to work with these
litigants to make legal sense of this crazy world.67

LAURA SPITZ:
A judge would have to be equally courageous to resist deferring to the
interests of big business, as those interests are presently cast. But here is
some good news. One day, you will be those judges (and those teachers)
(and those lawyers) (and those business people). So we want to end this
lecture in what is a hopeful and helpful way, and talk about how we can
organize our thoughts and approach our world. We’ve made a list!
1. Enter the interpretive debate. Keep in mind the great lesson of Legal
Realism and the critical legal studies movements of the late 20th
century, that representations of social life in rational disciplines such as
law or economics are actually contingent and political interpretations.68
This is a hopeful lesson. It means that we can be part of the
interpretive debate. We can be part of creating meanings and making
changes.
So for example, when Mr. Bush, or you, or I, or Judge Posner, or
any number of other people, say “market economy” or “free trade” or
“globalization” or “just war” or “terrorism,” we do not necessarily
mean the same things. It may be true that market economies are the
best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty, and I have many

VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003

553

554 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

progressive friends who believe that this is so, but what proponents of
this particular version of free-market capitalism (or this particular
version of war) have done is to slowly drag what should be a vigorous
popular debate about those issues onto a stagnant and univocal plane.
What we must do in response is explore various meanings of terms—
whether the term is “global trade” or “the rule of law”—and provide
the arguments for why society should understand them in a more
complex and more helpful way.
2. Trust your skills. “They” (the drafters of the National Security
Strategy, the Law and Economics theorists, the military leaders, the
business leaders) are just people, like you and me. Mr. Bush’s lawyers
went to law school and graduated and are making arguments before
courts all over this country about his National Security Strategy and the
scope, meaning, and constitutionality of legislation like the Patriot Act
or the Homeland Security Act. Trust your skills and yourself to be part
of the process. They are not right just because they are on his side.
3. Understand that the Social does not have to be adjunct to the Economic
(or the Military). In political and legal history, only recently has the
Market played such a large and seemingly inevitable and restrictive
role in how we think about social rights.69 It is even more recent that
anyone in the law business claimed to know what economics is, or what
economics necessarily means or demands in a given case. But it is
actually and obviously people who decide the interrelationships among
law, politics, and economics. This Administration, as part of its
National Security Strategy, has said that as a matter of foreign policy it
is necessary to the American vision of the world that other countries
must accept this Administration’s version of free-market capitalism as
“the single sustainable model” for economics and politics.70 In its
“negotiations” for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the U.S.
has consistently presented its vision (including lower marginal tax
rates) as nonnegotiable. It will not sign a trade agreement without an
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agreement for lower tax rates and other economic imperatives. But
those connections and lines are drawn as a matter of policy, not nature.
Why not instead: we are unable and unwilling to negotiate a free trade
agreement in the absence of some agreement about social and political
rights, including anti-discrimination rules and environmental
protection?
4. We need to be suspicious of:
(a) This Administration’s post-Reagan version of free-market
capitalism (as if there were not other versions of capitalism);
(b) The notion that human rights are inconsistent with business
interests;
(c) The market as a measure for how well we are doing as a society;71
(d) Anyone making a claim to neutrality, reason, or inevitability;
(e) Deference claims: When courts or government defer to the expertise
of corporations or militarism, they are granting “epistemological
privilege”72 to those interests, to both define questions and answer
them; and
(f) The oversimplification and classification of issues, particularly
when they are used to close conversations. I have read that
“NAFTA is not an employment issue.” Isn’t that rather like
saying: “Beautiful breasts are a bona fide occupational
qualification?” As a matter of fact, issues are complex and multidimensional. Resist attempts to essentialize them in ways that
serve one interest over all others.
5. Use your imagination. You have and will continue to acquire the
skills and interests necessary to be innovative. Corporations
encourage imagination, but they do not have a monopoly on it.
General Electric—the company who manufactured half of all the
fighter engines used in the first Gulf War,73 and then conveniently
had contracts to assist in the rebuilding of Kuwait when Desert
Storm ended74—has a corporate slogan: “What if imagination
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became reality?”75 When I read that, I think: “Exactly. What if,
indeed?”
1

Our thanks to Professor Kellye Testy for giving us the opportunity to speak at Seattle
University and for her unfailing commitment to social justice. Thank you also to the
faculty and audience at Seattle University for their support and comments. One member
of the audience in particular—Oakley Ramprashad—gave us love and inspiration.
2
That lecture is published as Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An
Outsider’s Guide, 15 VT. L. REV. 139 (1990).
3
USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 1).
4
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(codified as 6 U.S.C. § 101).
5
There’s no right place to begin in the vast “rule of law” literature, but the Hart/Fuller
debate, centering as it does on how a legal system might best resist a militarized
juggernaut, has particular relevance now. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). Three recent developments have sparked a
resurgence in rule of law thinking: first, capital’s need for “emerging markets” to provide
superstructural means for contract enforcement; see Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law
Revival, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Mar./Apr. 1998); second, the impeachment of President
Clinton; see Jessie Allen, Blind Faith and Reasonable Doubts: Investigating Belief in the
Rule of Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 12 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 691 (2001); and, third,
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
Among our favorite commentaries on the last topic are Kim Lane Scheppele, When the
Law Doesn’t Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1361 (2001); and Robin West, Reconstructing the Rule of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 215
(2001).
6
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Speech (Jan. 17, 1961), at http://www.eisenhower.
utexas.edu/farewell.htm.
7
Professor Diane Mazur has shown how, in his long tenure on the Court, Justice
Rehnquist has almost single-handedly elevated the doctrine of military deference, which
once required a showing of an actual nexus between a challenged policy and military
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the judiciary will
not question governmental allegations that U.S. citizen is an enemy combatant).
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enemy combatant. A federal district court judge in New York had previously granted
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estimated 100 or more attacks against the United States and its interests since Sept. 11,
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than the government’s ‘say-so’ regarding the validity of Hamdi’s classification as an
enemy combatant.” Id. at 535.
15
Nicholas D. Kristof, War and Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A25 (noting
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NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 2003 at 16.
17
On February 5, 2003, United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell gave an
elaborate speech to the United Nations Security Council, replete with charts and a slide
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archive/2000/corpnws_072600.jsp. And of course, Cheney has been Vice-President since
2001. Keeping that timeline in mind, let us turn to Halliburton. In the aftermath of
Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait in 1991, Halliburton was awarded contracts to help
bring burning oil wells under control. In addition, Brown & Root Services (a Halliburton
business unit) assessed and repaired damaged public buildings in Kuwait. Then, the U.S.
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2837477.stm; Danny Penman, U.S. Firms Set for
Post-War Contracts, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 11, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,911943,00.html.
It is not just Halliburton, of course, that is poised to benefit from a post-conflict Iraq.
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companies to compete for rebuilding projects in Iraq after a war “in what would be the
biggest rebuilding project since World War II.” US Awards Deals For Post-War Iraq,
BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2837657.stm. As
Penman writes: “It’s a sensitive topic because we still haven’t gone to war,” one industry
executive told the Wall Street Journal. “But these companies are really in a position to
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Apparently members of congress are not happy with the Administration’s secretiveness
about plans for a post-war Iraq. Senators Bash Pentagon for Postwar Iraq Secrecy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003 (on file with Seattle Journal for Social Justice). Also troubling is
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companies. BBC NEWS, US Firms Vie to Rebuild Ira, supra. While it is surely true that
somebody needs to repair the planned damage, and that the “coalition of the willing” is
diminished, the unilateral benefit to U.S. companies belies the purity of the
Administration’s justifications for the war.
26
For the original statement and the apology, see DEPT. OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE STATEMENT ON THE DRAFT, Jan. 21, 2003, at http://www.dod.mil/news/
Jan2003/b01212003_bt029-03.htm. An eminent military historian has explained the
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problem. ELIOT A. COHEN, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS: THE DILEMMAS OF MILITARY
SERVICE 20 (1985).
27
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 23.
28
Id. at 18.
29
Id. at 17.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 18-9.
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32

Which is connected to security and terrorism, thus: “Poverty does not make poor
people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can
made weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at v. See also, NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR COMBATING TERRORISM (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf:
These efforts to diminish underlying conditions have material as well as
intangible dimensions. Ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes,
foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies,
good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on
combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying
conditions that terrorists often seek to manipulate for their own advantage.
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
33
Id.
34
That is, one would need to take into account, as President Bush Sr. did in a speech at
Tufts University after the date of this lecture, that there is “[A] small fringe element that
frankly exist [sic] in every society...” 2003 Issam M. Fares Lecture—Former President
George H.W. Bush, TUFTS E-NEWS, Feb. 26, 2003, at http://enews.tufts.edu/stories/
030303BushSpeech.htm.
35
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at iv.
36
Professor Michael Ignatieff has recently described this cherry-picking approach to
legal obligation as an aspect of empire:
Being an imperial power, however, is more than being the most powerful
nation or just the most hated one. It means enforcing such order as there is in
the world and doing so in the American interest. It means laying down the
rules America wants (on everything from markets to weapons of mass
destruction) while exempting itself from the other rules (the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change and the International Criminal Court) that go against its
interest.
Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 6 (Magazine) at 22.
37
It may not be surprising that even though NAFTA was not ratified by two-thirds of the
Senate as required for treaties under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the
constitutionality of the NAFTA treaty has been held to be a political question
inappropriate for judicial review. Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242
F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).
38
Such as anti-discrimination laws or environmental protection laws.
39
Article 2018 of NAFTA provides that when a government is not in conformity
with NAFTA provisions, the government must either agree not to implement
the offending measure (typically a federal law) or agree to remove the
offending measure. If the government continues to be in noncompliance,
appropriate compensation must be offered or the aggrieved party may suspend
benefits until a settlement is reached.
Chantell Taylor, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous
Double Standard for Workers’ Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 401, 413 (2000).
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Presumably all human rights and anti-discrimination laws are trade restrictive, and we
can expect their further erosion under the present regime.
40
“Under Article 1116, a claim may be submitted to arbitration if an investor believes
that a government has breached an obligation under the NAFTA and that the breach
caused the investor to incur a loss or damage as a result.” Id. at 412.
41
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 19.
42
They do not have to, of course, since corporations and investors can enforce NAFTA.
43
Methlcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl.
44
This example is taken from Taylor, supra note 39, at 413-415. Taylor points out that
this is not the only case where a corporation has attempted to use NAFTA as a tool to
evade liability in local courts, relying on the government essentially to indemnify them.
In another case, a Canadian-based conglomerate, Loewen Group, was the defendant in a
Mississippi lawsuit and found liable for fraud and gross business misconduct for its
aggressive attempts to ruin a small local funeral home and insurance operator. The jury
awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $100 million (compensatory) and $400
million (punitive).
Rather than appeal, Loewen settled the case for $150 million. Now, Loewen
has filed a claim for $725 million against the U.S. government under
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, claiming that the jury verdict, the punitive damages,
and the appeal bond requirement ‘violated international legal norms of
‘fairness,’ discriminated against the Canadian-based corporation and attempted
to ‘expropriate’ or seize Loewen’s assets …’ in derogation of NAFTA
guarantees.
Id. at 414.
45
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination in employment, but
provides as a defense that sex, i.e. being a man or a woman, could be a “bona fide
occupational qualification,” (BFOQ) “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). When a “facially
neutral” employment policy disproportionately effects a protected class, it is a defense
that the policy is justified by “business necessity.” The business necessity defense was
judicially created, but found statutory footing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B). By virtue of this system, Hooters is legally permitted to hire
only women as servers (to be “Hooters Girls”), to demand that they have large breasts,
and to require employees to sign an acknowledgment that they will not find the
environment “offensive, hostile or unwelcome.” See Joseph M. Kelly & Adele Sinclair,
Sexual Harassment of Employees by Customers and Other Third Parties: American and
British Views, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 807, 824-825 (2000); see also Hooters of America,
Inc., Hooters.com: About Hooters, at http://www.hootersofamerica.com/company/
about_hooters (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
46
See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2002).
47
Without appropriate tort remedies, of course, corporations suffer no significant penalty
when they choose to enhance their own profits by endangering the consuming public.
The whole point of punitive damages, for example, was because actual damages would
not be sufficient to punish or deter reprehensible conduct—that is, conduct constituting
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an abuse of power or trust, or maliciously motivated. Capping punitive damages is
unlikely to deter abuses of power, and arbitrarily caps limit the remedy’s efficiency. Id.
at 54-72.
48
Consider the immunities for pharmaceutical companies stuck into the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1714-17, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified
as 6 U.S.C. § 101). Such special favors created considerable debate, until Republicans
agreed that they would cooperate in removing those provisions later. The amendments
are pending in the 2003 budget bill. See Conference Report on H.J. Res. 2, Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution, 2003, 149 Cong. Rec. H707-01 (2003) (statement of Rep.
Young); and see, e.g., H.R. 484, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 41 108th Cong. (2003); and S. 105
108th Cong. (2003). Consider also the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 501, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230) (internet Services
Providers are insulated from a broad range of torts, including federal immunity from any
cause of action that would make them liable for information originating with a third party
user of the service, regardless of the service providers state of mind/knowledge); the
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-230, § 1, 112 Stat. 1519
(1998) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 1601) (companies that supply raw materials such as
silicone or components for medical implants given federal immunity); Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 46, at 97-98; and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104134, § 801, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1997) (“Places limits on the
rights of prisoners to recover for a variety of lawsuits including the unprotected exposure
to asbestos hazards”). Rustad & Koenig, supra note 46, at 71.
49
After our lecture, the BBC reported that: “Tumbling insurance shares have been a
feature of falling stock markets. As prices fall, these companies’ large equity holdings
reduce in value, and they are forced to make further sales so they have sufficient cash
reserves.” Of course, damages caps and litigation roadblocks that make it difficult for
victims to make claims are just another way of cutting insurance costs to make up for
these losses.
BBC NEWS, UK Shares Hit New Low, Mar. 11, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2837711.stm.
50
“President Bush is making a renewed push for strict limits on jury awards he blames
for skyrocketing premiums.” Richard Oppel Jr., Bush Enters Fray Over Malpractice,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24.
51
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 46, at 51.
52
See generally JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: HOW
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGE AMERICA’S SOCIAL
AGENDA (1996).
53
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 46, at 74–76.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 54.
56
The New York Times reports that 39% of Americans believe that they are or will be in
the richest 1% of the population. David Brooks, The Triumph of Hope Over Self-Interest,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 4 at 15. Perhaps executives will continue to walk away
with their gigantic profits and we are going to let them because we think it could be us.
57
The Secretary of the Army is Thomas E. White. See Matt Bivens, Enron: Under
Cover of Dark and the War, DAILY TIMES PAK., Feb. 23, 2003, at
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http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-2-2003_pg4_11; Jason
Leopold, Tom White Played Key Role In Covering Up Enron Losses, SCOOP, Oct. 8,
2002, at http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0210/S00052.htm; and Army
Secretary’s Enron Role Probed, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2002, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A25816-2002Feb17. See also U.S. ARMY,
Official Biography of Thomas E. White, at www.army.mil/leaders/Secarmy/bio.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2003):
Secretary White has statutory responsibility for all matters relating to Army
manpower, personnel, reserve affairs, installations, environmental issues,
weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and financial
management. Secretary White is responsible for the department’s annual
budget of nearly $82 billion.
Id. After we gave this presentation, Secretary White was fired by Mr. Rumsfeld. See
Rumsfeld Set to Change Army Leadership, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 2003, at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Army
58
Doe v. Bush, No. 03-1266, 2003 U.S. App. WL 1093975, at *1 (1st Cir. Mar. 12,
2003), petition denied, No. 03-1266, 2003 U.S. App. WL 1221158 (1st Cir. Mar. 18,
2003), available at http://www.mfso.org/.
59
We do not think that judicial review is “the answer” by any means, but is only one of
many tools that can have positive political consequences. For a wonderful account of
usually “losing” efforts to constrain military adventurism by legal means, see Jules Lobel,
Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1995).
60
Four Justices—Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, and Brennan—wanted to hear Vietnam
matters, but they were never willing to do so in the same case, so the four votes required
to grant certiorari were never put together. Rodric B. Schoen, Strange Silence: Vietnam
and the Supreme Court, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 304 (1994).
61
The only Supreme Court decision nominally addressing the merits was Atlee v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), summarily aff’d, Atlee v. Laird, 339 F.Supp. 1347
(E.D. Pa. 1972), in which a three-judge district court had dismissed a taxpayer class
action challenge to the constitutionality of the war as a political question. A summary
affirmance, of course, only endorses the lower court result, not the lower court reasoning.
62
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
63
For an introduction to the technical problems, see Lobel, supra note 59; and see
Michal R. Belknap, Constitutional Law as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren
Court have Ended the Vietnam War?, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 99 (1999). Two excellent
overviews of constitutional national security problems are JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993);
and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
64
In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the state of Georgia had no jurisdiction over Cherokee Nation lands. Georgia
openly ignored the decision, and President Jackson took no steps to force compliance.
According to the story, Jackson said, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him
enforce it.” See Joseph Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525 (1969). However, the Court had not entered a final
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order and the President was under no legal obligation. The private party petitioners did
not pursue the litigation. ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 210-212 (6th ed. 1983).
65
Federal courts are not empowered directly to enjoin the President regarding “nonministerial” executive obligations. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
However, in otherwise justiciable causes, courts may enter such orders against other
executive officers, effectively forcing the President to comply.
Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-803 (1992). Thus, even in a wartime context, the
Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of Commerce to return steel mills to their owners,
after President Harry S. Truman had ordered confiscation to keep the mills from being
idled by a strike during the Korean War. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). Within half an hour after the Supreme Court announced that decision,
President Truman dispatched a letter to the Secretary of Commerce reversing the earlier
order of confiscation. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST
CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 515 (1990). In addition, of course, courts may compel
Presidential compliance with criminal investigations, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), and sitting Presidents may be civilly sued for conduct while out of
presidential office. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 680 (1997).
66
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
67
This discussion of the political question doctrine is paraphrased from Ann C. Scales,
Militarism, Male Dominance, and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 68-70 (1989), which was itself taken from an analysis by Anne
E. Simon.
68
See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
69
See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Family Inc.: What is the Difference Between a ‘Family’ and
a ‘Corporation’?, in COMMODIFICATION FUTURES (Martha Ertman & Joan Williams
eds., forthcoming); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 68-76 (1957); MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE
ECONOMICS (1972); and MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR
EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 32 (W.D. Halls trans., 1990).
70
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at iv.
71
See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1436
(2001).
72
The term “epistemological privilege” is discussed in Ann Scales, Feminist Legal
Method: Not So Scary, 2 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 23-29 (1992).
73
As General Electric says about itself:
Many years of successful GE military engine programs culminated in 1991
when more than half of all the aircraft of the U.S. and other Allied forces in
Operation Desert Storm were produced by GE Aircraft Engines. More than
5,000 GE engines were deployed during Desert Storm, powering fighters,
tankers, helicopters, transports, and surveillance aircraft, including F-14s, F16s, F-5s, F-4s, C-5s, KC-135Rs, F-117A Stealth fighters, F-18s, A-10s, S-3s,
and Black Hawk and Apache helicopters, both powered by GE’s T700 engine.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC, GEAE HISTORY, GE AIRCRAFT ENGINES: NINE DECADES THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD at http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/history.html#subsection3 (last
visited May 2, 2003). See generally http://www.ge.com.
74
See, e.g., Press reslease, General Electric, Kuwait Airways Selects GE90-90B to
Power New Boeing 777-200 (July 23, 1996), available at http://www.geae.com/
aboutgeae/presscenter/ge90/ge90_19960723.html (GE and Kuwait Airlines); and
http://www.ge.com/gulf/index.htm.
75
See GENERAL ELECTRIC, GE ADVERSTING at http://www.ge.com/en/company/
companyinfo/ads.htm; http://www.ge.com; and http://www.geimaginationatwork.com/
upgrade.html (last visited May 2, 2003). When we visited http://www.nytimes.com
during the writing of this presentation, and proceeded to articles in the Business section,
we frequently encountered two advertisements flashing in a box at the top of the page.
The first began: “WHAT IF IMAGINATION BECAME REALITY;” then it flashed, “AND
WORLD CLASS SCIENTISTS COULD PLAY LIKE KIDS?” and then, “THEN YOU WOULD HAVE
SOME OF THE COOLEST PRODUCTS EVER;” and finally, “GE: IMAGINATION AT WORK.”
The second advertisement began: “IMAGINATION MEANS;” then it flashed, “TAKING A
POWERFUL IDEA AND GIVING IT A CHANCE TO FLY;” and finally, “GE: IMAGINATION AT
WORK.”
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